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Foreword
All of the articles in this Symposium deal with the question to
what extent liberalism as a political philosophy is consistent with cit-
izens' and officials' reliance on religious-based arguments in fashion-
ing coercive public policy ("the question"). Kent Greenawalt sets
forth a good map of the contending positions on the question. And
the position he stakes out for himself is a moderate one: sometimes
reliance on religious-based arguments is proper, but sometimes it is
not. Greenawalt walks us through a very subtle and complex analysis
of what makes views, religious or not, accessible or inaccessible to
others, and what should turn on accessibility in terms of coercive
policy.
Robert Audi takes the most secularist position among the contrib-
utors. He offers criteria for defining religious arguments to differen-
tiate them from the purely secular. He then argues that, in a liberal
democracy, coercive public policy should be based only on accessible
reasons, which do not include religious reasons. Indeed, Audi even
argues that religious belief itself can support exclusive reliance on
secular arguments in the public domain.
Michael Perry's article provides a good contrast to Audi's, for
Perry strongly denies that religious arguments should not influence
coercive public policy. Perry canvasses various reasons offered for
liberal "neutrality" with regard to religious-based arguments and re-
jects them all. Perry attempts to support the principal defining char-
acteristics of a liberal society by arguments drawn from his own
religious beliefs.
Larry Solum argues that the proper axis for determining which
arguments are improper bases for state coercion is not the axis that
divides religious from secular; rather it is the access that divides
"nonpublic" reasons from "public" reasons. Public reasons consist of
(1) common-sense beliefs, (2) ideas from our public political culture,
and (3) the noncontroversial conclusions of science. These reasons
are the only proper bases for state coercion, for only these can be
reasonably accepted by all subject to that coercion.
Larry Alexander rejects any epistemological divide separating reli-
gious from secular arguments, and concomitantly rejects any princi-
ple that would exclude the latter from the public foi'um.
Nevertheless, Alexander endorses liberalism as a political theory,
which he thinks is both correct and also deeply paradoxical. Liber-
alism must take the position, not that illiberal religious views should
be excluded from the public forum because they are religious, but
that they should be excluded - if they should - because they are
wrong. The paradox of liberalism is that though illiberal views are
wrong from liberalism's perspective, they should be tolerated because
of the value of autonomy, a value illiberal religions reject.
The first five articles set forth the epistemological and justificatory
debates over religious-based arguments in a rather decontextualized
way. With the exception of some of Michael Perry's, the arguments
do not refer to any particular historical condition or religious tradi-
tion, except by way of example. Charles Larmore takes up the case
for secularization by placing it in the context of the Judeo-Christian
tradition and relating it to the idea of God's transcendence. Moral
authority is now necessarily located in our form of life, central to
which is liberalism's moral minimalism.
Jeremy Waldron also focuses on some quite specific historical and
cultural phenomena, in this case the Catholic Bishops' pastoral letter
on economic justice. The letter seeks to guide not just Catholics, but
everyone. It is inconsistent with any conception of liberalism that
would rule out reliance on religious-based arguments in forming
public policy. Waldron examines the arguments for such an exclu-
sion and finds them unpersuasive.
John Garvey takes us inside the Catholic tradition and examines
the predicament of the liberal citizen or public official who is also
Catholic. Garvey distinguishes among the various types of authority
the Catholic Church exerts over its members and how that authority
affects its members' obligations regarding the wider society.
Also writing from within the Catholic tradition, David Hol-
lenbach, echoing Michael Perry's position, argues for a completely
open dialogue over public policy among the adherents of various reli-
gions and the nonreligious. He is skeptical of the possibility of any
"neutralist" version of public dialogue that excludes religious argu-
ments. He paints a picture of the Catholic tradition as one open to
others' arguments in addition to being itself the source of arguments.
In the final paper, Maimon Schwarzschild locates the debate over
"the question" in Western history. Religious-based arguments are
suspect in liberalism because liberalism was an Enlightenment re-
sponse to the Christianity of its time, which it viewed as ignorant,
cruel, and corrupt. Christianity's separation of the secular from the
sacred encouraged the development of the secular modernism char-
acteristic of modern liberalism. Today, however, religion is no longer
the prime threat to liberalism, nor are the reasons for excluding it
from the public square as strong as those for excluding Communism,
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Fascism, or other illiberal movements. Indeed, religion offers goods
that represent a desirable counterweight to those of secular
modernity.

